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ABSTRACT
This policy brief argues that Afghanistan is far from 
stability and that misconceptions leading to other 
conclusions further erode the potential of progress and 
peace in the country and region. While the presence 
and support of the international community is vital, 
there must be a shift in its approach in Afghanistan; 
foremost with regards to its willingness to negotiate 
with the Taliban.  Furthermore, although maintaining 
and improving security is essential, it does not tackle 
jihadist indoctrination, the root cause of the Taliban’s 
success. In addition it is essential to view the situation 
in Afghanistan through a regional prism, thus 
acknowledging the impactful role of Pakistan, Iran, 
Central Asian States and India. Since women and 
minorities are especially under attack in countries 
impacted by religious extremism, this paper also 
highlights their plight.
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1. Introduction  
 
After the fall of Kunduz to the Taliban, which embodied the pinnacle of the group’s 
resurgence, Western policy makers were quick to issue statements addressing the dire 
situation and the need to remain committed to the cause of Afghan security and 
democratization. Several declarations of support are however impaired by 
contradictions and a daunting lack of understanding of the realities on the ground. 
At a meeting of European Defence Ministers in Brussels on 8th October 2015, the 
German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen voiced her concern over rigid 
withdrawal timetables and the increasing insecurity in Afghanistan by stating “the 
developments in Kunduz show that we have walked together with the Afghans […] we 
have to walk on”.1 
 
Surprisingly, 20 days later German’s Interior Minister dwelling on the increase of 
refugees to Germany proclaimed, “one could expect the Afghans to stay in their 
country”, alluding to the fact that there were enough safe pockets in Afghanistan. 
This is in stark contrast to the evaluation of Afghanistan’s Minister of Refugees and 
Repatriations, who pleaded with Germany to put an end to deportations due to the 
deteriorating security situation.2 
 
Misconceptions of “safe zones” demonstrate the unfamiliarity of the progress the 
Taliban has made in the past months. Kabul often depicted as a “safe zone” 
previously witnessed an attack on its parliament as well as on the luxury hotel 
“Serena”. This is not what one would expect from a “safe zone”. In the words of 
                                                
1 “NATO May Need to Stay Longer in Afghanistan, Germany Says.” The Times of 
India (World), October 8, 2015. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-
asia/NATO-may-need-to-stay-longer-in-Afghanistan-Germany-
says/articleshow/49272444.cms  
2 Delcker, Janosch. “German Cracks Down on Afghan Migrants.” Politico, October 
28, 2015. http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-afghan-migration-asylum-refugees-
syria/.  
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Florian Weigand “ which of our politicians would declare a safe city, if the Reichstag 
and the Adlon Hotel were attacked by terrorists?”3 
 
Prior to the attack on Kunduz, U.S. officials openly declared that insurgents did not 
possess the potential to substantially threaten the stability of the government.4 
It is unfortunate that it took a violent take-over of an entire city to come to terms with 
the fact that Afghanistan is not on the path to stability and security.  
 
Even institutions that are solely dedicated to Afghanistan, such as the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) overestimated the level of progress 
and stability in the Hindu Kush. Its resolution 2210 issued on 16th March 2015 
claimed that Afghanistan was now under the auspices of a stable unity government 
that had improved ties to Pakistan. In addition it supported the widespread notion of a 
frail, fragmented and weak Taliban.5 
 
The capture of Kunduz made clear that resolution 2210 did not match reality. The 
current unity government is still weak and fractured; most of the Minister posts are 
still vacant, the power-sharing model between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief 
Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah is built on sand.6 
 
The Taliban have not been weakened, quite the contrary. The terrorist outlet has used 
negotiations to stall, post-pone, re-group, re-arm and launch attacks and continues to 
receive tactical and logistical support from the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI). Already at the end of May, before the attack on Afghanistan’s Parliament and 
                                                
3 Weigand, Florian. “Opinion: A Desperate Attempt to Find Safe Areas in 
Afghanistan.” Deutsche Welle, October 26, 2015. http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-a-
desperate-attempt-to-find-safe-areas-in-afghanistan/a-18806721.  
4 Katzman, Kenneth. “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. 
Policy.” CRS Report. Congressional Research Service, October 15, 2015, p.i. 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf  
5 Stobdan, P. “Afghanistan and the Region.” Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses, April 20, 2015. 
http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/AfghanistanandtheRegion_pstobdan_200414.  
6 Ibidem. 
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Kunduz, it became more and more evident that 2015 was on its way to becoming the 
bloodiest year since 2001.7   
If the West does not start altering fundamental aspects of its support model, namely 
the continuation of unconditional aid to Pakistan, betting on fruitful negotiations with 
the Taliban, sticking to rigid timelines of withdrawal and combatting jihadism solely 
through the prism of security all progress made in the realms of democratization, 
education, human rights, women’s rights, minority rights and freedom of expression 
is at stake.  
 
2. The track record of the international community 
 
The evaluation of the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan in terms of 
military personnel deployed, funding, infrastructural projects, humanitarian aid and 
state-building, inevitably results in an ambivalent report card. While there are success 
stories that have helped Afghanistan recuperate from the Taliban reign post 2001 the 
recent surge of the terror group has shown how fragile progress is, and how easily it 
can be distorted or completely reversed.  
 
One of these success stories is the rise in overall life expectancy from 45 to 60 and the 
strong decline of maternal and child mortality, which can largely be attributed to an 
overall improvement of sanitation, hospitals and trained health professionals.8 
 
In addition compared to 2002, where one million children were in school (almost 
exclusively boys), in 2015 8.7 million children are attending schools, 40 % of them 
are girls. The number of teachers has increased ten-fold from 20,000 in 2002 to nearly 
                                                
7 Felhab-Brown, Vanda. “Blood and Hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 Update.” 
Brookings, May 26, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-isis-
taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown. 
8 The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (Germany). 
“Continued Support for Afghanistan.” Afghanistan-Foreign Mission for the 
Bundeswehr, December 5, 2014.  
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2014/12_en/2014-12-05-
afghanistan-mandat-steinmeier_en.html   
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200,000 today. Real GDP growth is projected to increase to 3.1 and 3.9 in 2016 and 
2017.9 
 
However upon closer examination the positive trends appear bleaker. A large amount 
of schools built are still operating from tents, houses or under trees. Only roughly half 
of the teachers meet required educational standards. Furthermore, although the rate of 
girls entering schools has risen, the drop out rates are extremely high and Afghanistan 
still ranks amongst the lowest countries with regards to adult literacy.10  
 
And while western countries have invested a lot of resources, manpower and time to 
maintain stability and train security personnel, the current situation demonstrates how 
futile these attempts now appear; especially after announcing concrete timelines for 
departure. According to the United Nations the Taliban insurgency has spread through 
more of Afghanistan than at any other given time since Operation Enduring Freedom 
in 2001.11 In the first two weeks of October the UNAMA had to abandon four of its 
13 provincial offices due to insurgency activities. The threat level in about half of the 
country’s administrative districts has been rated either “high” or “extreme”.12 
 
This trend of rising insecurity and violence is also matched by the perception of 
instability and fear within Afghanistan’s populace. As the graph below13 indicates 
there was a substantial increase in 2013, interestingly the year where Afghan Forces 
assumed lead responsibility for security across the country.14 
                                                
9 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. “Eyes on the Prize in Afghanistan.” Foreign Affairs, 
October 21, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2015-10-
21/eyes-prize-afghanistan.  
10 BBC. “Afghanistan: Before and after the Taliban,” April 2, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26747712.  
11 Nordland, Rod, and Joseph Goldstein. “Afghan Taliban’s Reach Is Widest Since 
2001, U.N. Says.” New York Times, October 11, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-united-
nations.html?_r=2.  
12 Ibidem 
13 Hopkins, Nancy, and et al. “Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People.” 
The Asia Foundation, 2014,p.32. 
https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2014final.pdf.  
14 NATO. “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2013,” January 27, 2014. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_106247.htm.  
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Q: How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these 
days? (Percentage of respondents who answered “always,” “often,” or “sometimes”) 
Hopkins, Nancy, and et al. “Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People.” The Asia 
Foundation, 2014,p.32. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2014final.pdf  
 
John F. Sopko, the US “Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction” 
exemplifies the status quo in Afghanistan: 
 
“Please don't conclude that the Afghan picture is uniformly bleak, a landscape of 
nothing but wreckage, ruin, and waste […] still, we must face the facts before us. 
Afghanistan remains one of the world's poorest, least developed, and most corrupt 
countries, with weak ministries in a central government whose presence and support 
in rural areas is often minimal or tenuous. Though total U.S. funding for the Afghan 
National Defense and Security Forces has topped $65 billion since FY 2002, the 
Taliban and other insurgents are still fighting and capable of attacks across 
Afghanistan. The question then, is what have we and the Afghans really gotten for our 
14-year-long, $110 billion investment?”15 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
15 Sopko, John F. “Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction For Delivery at Weill Cornell Medical College, New 
York City May 5, 2015 ‘Afghanistan Reconstruction: Fact vs. Fantasy.’” New York 
City, May 5, 2015. 
https://www.sigar.mil/newsroom/ReadFile.aspx?SSR=7&SubSSR=29&File=speeches
/15/SIGAR_Cornell_Speech.html  
Afghanistan in 201432
2.1    Fear for Safety
Key Questions
Q-20. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family 
these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you 
and your family’s safety?
Q-31. Now I will read you a list of different activities that you could participate in. Please   
 tell me whether you would participate in the following activities with no fear, some  
 fear, or a lot of fear? a) Voting in a national/provincial election, b) Participating in a  
 peaceful demonstration, c) Running for public office, d) Encountering the ANP, e)    
 Encountering the ANA, f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of   
 the country, g) Encountering international forces.
The number of Afghans who say they fear for their personal safety has risen significantly since the survey 
began in 2006. This year 65.4% of respondents report that they always, often, or sometimes fear for their 
personal safety (Fig. 2.1).
   FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY
FIG. 2.1: Q-20. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your 
family these days? (percentage of respondents who answered “always,” “often,” or “sometimes”)
The percent ge of residents who report some level of fear for personal safety is highest in the South East 
(76.9%) and West (79.2%) regions, where clashes with AOGs have b en most frequent (Fig. 2.2). The 
provinces most likely to report some level of fear for personal safety are Faryab (92.1%), Wardak (89.2%), 
Farah (87.5%), and Kunduz (87.5%). The provinces least likely to report some level of fear are Panjshir 
(1.5%), Badakhshan (18.3%), and Bamyan (24.7%). Among those living in insecure and AOG-controlled 
areas, the percentage who report feeling some level of fear is 74.2%.10
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With the entire World engulfed by the advancements of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the 
premature withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which left behind a dysfunctional security 
apparatus, a sectarian government under the authoritarian and under Tehran patronage 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as well as a hotbed for violence should act as a danger 
sign. Afghanistan does not have to be condemned to the same future as Iraq, but it 
may well be if the West underestimates the task at hand.16 
 
Although the international community has committed itself to further improve the 
situation in Afghanistan, for example through the “Resolute Support Mission” that 
was launched on 1st January 2015,17 the strong decrease of Western troops, aid and 
developmental workers and overall commitment only heightens what experts of the 
Hindu Kush have already known for quite some time.  
 
The future of Afghanistan will increasingly depend on the strategies and policies of 
regional actors. It is to be expected that the West’s new role will be more passive and 
that it will rely on supporting those actors that share similar goals in the realm of 
nation-building, development, democratization, human rights, women’s rights, 
minority rights and stability.  
 
The next chapters shed light on the strong regional dimension by analysing the role of 
India, Pakistan, Iran and that of Central Asian States. 
 
3.  Pakistan’s Double Game in Afghanistan 
 
Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan with the implicit main aim of sustaining 
“Strategic Depth” 18  vis-á-vis India by supporting and instrumentalizing various 
                                                
16 McNally, Lauren, and Paul Bucula. “The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to 
Afghanistan’s Security.” Afghanistan Report. Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 
March 2015. 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AFGH%20Report.pdf.  
17 NATO. “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan,” February 27, 2015. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.  
18 A concept, first coined by General Mirza Aslam Beg (later Chief of Army Staff 
working under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1980s which describes Pakistan’s 
attempt to utilize Afghanistan as an strategic instrument against India by attempting to 
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violent Islamists is one of the main root causes for the unabated success of the Taliban 
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. A NATO report based on 27,000 interrogations 
with more than 4,000 detained Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorist groups 
that leaked to the public in 2012, shows the extent of control the Pakistan’s security 
establishment and especially the ISI has over the Taliban. The report indicates that 
Pakistan’s security apparatus is not only aware of the location, operations and 
strategies of senior Taliban leaders, but that senior Taliban figures such as Nasiruddin 
Haqqani reside in close proximity to ISI headquarters in Islamabad.19  
 
The goal of Pakistan’s security establishment that exerts a firm grip on the country’s 
foreign policy decision-making20 is to create a pro-Pakistani Afghan state. This Pro-
Pakistani state would provide Islamabad with a vast geographical entity, in which it 
could train and equip Islamist militants such as the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). These terrorist groups 
would give Pakistan the capacity of raising the number of non-attributable attacks in 
Jammu, Kashmir, and in other parts of India.21 In the past decade and a half, Pakistan 
has portrayed itself as a country that is in dire need of financial assistance to combat 
terrorism, while at the same time using these funds to a) engage in an arms race with 
India and b) support terrorist groups in Afghanistan, most notably the Taliban and the 
Haqqani network that have launched attacks against ISAF, the Afghan National 
                                                                                                                                      
control and influence the political landscape and actors (for a more detailed overview 
see: Siddique, Q. 2011:Pakistan’s Future Policy Towards Afghanistan: A look at 
Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and the US, DIIS Report) 
19 BBC. “Pakistan Helping Afghan Taliban-Nato,” February 1, 2012.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16821218.  
20 Wolf, Siegfried. “Pakistan: Ending the Semblance of Civil-Military Cordiality?” 
The International Relations and Security Network, November 24, 2014.       
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=185778.  
21 Hanauer, Larry, and Peter Chalk. “India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan-
Implications for the United States and the Region.” Occasional Paper. RAND, Center 
for Asia Pacific Policy, 2012,p.25. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.
pdf.  
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Army, the Afghan National Police personnel and civilians in Afghanistan, India and 
Pakistan.22  
 
In the initial stages of the Afghanistan campaign, Pakistan’s former President and 
military leader Pervez Musharraf was successful in positioning Pakistan as the key 
logistical hub for NATO supply lines, thus creating dependency on Pakistan. 
Musharraf had the leverage to open or close supply routes at will and was able to 
increase support and funds for advancing Pakistan’s strategic rationale. In an 
interview conducted by the Guardian February 2015 Pervez Musharraf very openly 
and blatantly admitted that when he was in power the ISI had fostered the Taliban. 
 
“In President Karzai’s times, yes, indeed, he was damaging Pakistan and therefore 
we were working against his interest […] we had to protect our own interest […] 
obviously we were looking for some groups to counter this Indian action against 
Pakistan” […] that is where the intelligence work comes in. Intelligence being in 
contact with Taliban groups, definitely they were in contact, and they should be.”23 
 
In her book The Wrong Enemy, Carlotta Gall describes the modus operandi of this 
double game, in which Pakistan gives NATO and the US public support and private 
official guarantees and assurance that Pakistan is allied with the West, while 
providing covert support to Islamist terrorists in Afghanistan and beyond through the 
ISI.24 The epitome of ISI’s entrenched ties to terrorists is embodied by the special 
desk the ISI ran assigned with the task of handling Osama bin Laden.25 
 
                                                
22 See: Yusuf, Moeed. Decoding Pakistan’s Strategic Shift in Afghanistan. Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2013. 
http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRI13wcaMY.pdf.  
23 Boone, Jon. “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s Backing for Proxies in Afghanistan 
Must Stop.” The Guardian, February 13, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-
proxies-afghanistan-ghani-taliban.  
24 See Gill, Carlotta. The Wrong Enemey: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014. 
Boston, MA, USA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. 
25 Tomsen, Peter. “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan--and How to Make It Right,” 
December 2014. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2014-10-
19/good-war.  
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Pakistan has been successful in outmanoeuvring the West and especially the US 
throughout the entire Afghanistan campaign. Recently US officials started trying to 
reach out to the Taliban to initiate potential peace talks. Pakistan assured the US that 
it was facilitating contacts and talks with Mohammed Omar, although they knew that 
he had been dead for over two years.26 
 
Christine Fair, one of the most renowned experts on Pakistan dwells on the losses and 
pitfalls of US support to Pakistan in the realm of its Afghanistan strategy. 
 
“Pakistan undercuts key U.S. interests in the region and it perdures as a source of 
Islamist terrorism at home and abroad. The items that Washington has conveyed to 
Pakistan have little utility in fighting insurgents and terrorists; rather, they enable 
Pakistan to better fight India, a democratic American partner that has long endured 
Pakistani predations. Since 9/11, the United States has lavished Pakistan with nearly 
$8 billion in security assistance, $11 billion in economic assistance, and $13 billion 
in the lucrative program known as Coalition Support Funds (CSF).  Without 
Pakistan’s direct military, diplomatic, political and financial support—as well as 
secure sanctuaries—in Pakistani territory, the insurgents would not be as lethal or as 
capable as they are.”27 
 
Even the tools that could be used to create checks and balances with regards to US 
funding to Pakistan are not being used. In 2009 US congress made aid to Pakistan 
conditional to certain criteria, for example the state’s success in fighting terrorism and 
a diminishing influence of the military in Pakistani politics. But instead of adhering to 
                                                
26 Zakaria, Fareed. “The Key to Solving the Puzzle of Afghanistan Is Pakistan.” The 
Washington Post, October 8, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
key-to-solving-the-puzzle-of-afghanistan/2015/10/08/1ebfa63a-6df1-11e5-aa5b-
f78a98956699_story.html.  
27 Fair, Christine. “America’s Pakistan Policy Is Sheer Madness.” The National 
Interest, May 15, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-pakistan-policy-
sheer-madness-12894?page=2.  
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the nature of the bill, the Secretary of State repeatedly insisted that continuing 
financial aid to Pakistan was a matter of national security.28  
 
The “Kerry Lugar Berman Bill”, which was authorized by US Congress that same 
year, promised $1.5 billion in aid annually for five years. The false assumption was 
that these additional financial assets would curb Pakistani support for the Taliban and 
the Haqqani network.29 This is the problem in a nutshell: the only way to reduce ISI 
backed terrorist activities is to decrease and not increase funding to Pakistan. The 
military is misappropriating the funds, stifling progress of civil society and further 
eroding the possibility of civilian control in Pakistan. Through its unconditional 
support the US and the West have signalled to Pakistan that it is too big, or too 
important, to fail.  
 
After the horrendous attack by the Taliban in Peshawar, killing over 130 innocent 
school children, there was short-lived hope that Pakistan might finally alter its 
relationship with the Taliban. But instead of taking ownership, Islamabad resorted to 
the usual blaming-game pointing fingers at New Delhi and Kabul.30  
 
The attacks in Kabul in the first week of August 2015 that killed more than 50 people 
were a stark reminder that there had not been a change in the relationship of 
Pakistan’s military establishment and terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan. 
Afghani spokesman for the National Directorate of Security Hassib Sediqi announced 
that Afghan intelligence had confirmed “Pakistani military interference” and that 
“special circles of the Pakistani military were behind all those attacks”, further 
                                                
28 Haqqani, Husain. “U.S. Policies Aggravate Pakistan’s Dysfunction.” Huffington 
Post, October 21, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/husain-haqqani/us-policies-
aggravate-pak_b_8350112.html.  
29 Panda, Aparna. “U.S. Should Stop Reinforcing Pakistan’s Delusions.” Hudson 
Institute, September 1, 2015. http://www.hudson.org/research/11589-u-s-should-stop-
reinforcing-pakistan-s-delusions.  
30 Shams, Shamil. “Pakistan Refuses Self Examination over Peshawar Attack.” 
Deutsche Welle, December 17, 2014. http://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-refuses-self-
examination-over-peshawar-attack/a-18137003.  
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adding that the ISI was working through the Haqqani network. 31  In a news 
conference, Ashraf Ghani, who had been criticized for making too many concessions 
to Pakistan, confirmed the concerns of external involvement. 
 
“We hoped for peace but we are receiving messages of war from Pakistan […] the 
last few days have shown that suicide member training camps and bomb-producing 
factories which are killing our people are as active as before in Pakistan”32 
 
 
In an interview Thomas Ruttig, the co-director of the think tank “Afghanistan 
Analysts Network”, echoed the sentiments of Afghani officials, after being asked if 
Pakistan’s military establishment was really interested in bringing about change in 
Afghanistan 
 “I think the national interest of Pakistan as it is defined by the military establishment 
is remaining as influential as possible in Afghanistan, continuing to use the Taliban 
as their main card. Even if there are promises that they would change this, we have 
not seen tangible results. So we still need to be doubtful of the position of Pakistan. 
Yes, I'm sceptical, but I wish it would change and that the Afghan Government would 
achieve the aim of convincing Pakistan that it is also in their own interest to end the 
war in Afghanistan”33 
The trajectory of Pakistan’s exploitation of Afghanistan has not changed. The military 
top brass is still misappropriating funds from the West to promote its own agenda of 
countering India by supporting terrorist groups. There needs to be a more coherent 
revaluation of cash flows to Islamabad. On 11th June 2015 the US House of 
Representatives defeated an amendment of the annual defence appropriations bills 
                                                
31 DAWN. “Afghan Intel Claims Pakistan Implicated in Kabul Attacks,” August 12, 
2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1200054.  
32 Haider, Ifran. “Ashraf Ghani Slams Pakistan over Recent Kabul Attacks.” DAWN, 
August 10, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1199613.  
33 Grassi, Daniele. “Afghanistan: Missed Opportunities and Threats for the Future. 
Interview with Thomas Ruttig.” East Online, May 14, 2015. 
http://www.eastonline.eu/en/opinioni/open-doors/afghanistan-missed-opportunities-
and-threats-for-the-future-interview-with-thomas-ruttig-co-director-of-the-
afghanistan-analysts-network.  
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that aimed to put aid flow to Pakistan under more scrutiny (it failed on a vote of 114-
318).34 For now, Pakistan has managed to convince, especially the US that it is the 
sine qua non for progress in Afghanistan. Without putting an end to this “carte 
blanche” stability and security in Afghanistan will remain a pipedream. 
4. Iran’s increasing support for the Taliban 
 
Both Western and Afghan sources have confirmed that Tehran has covertly been 
increasing its supply of weapons, ammunition as well as funding to the Taliban. 
According to a US Department of Defense report from October 2014 the 
Revolutionary Guard Corps have been providing weapons to terrorist groups in 
Afghanistan since 2007. In an Armed Services Committee hearing in October 2015, 
General John Campbell reiterated the notion of rising Iran-Taliban ties by claiming 
“at this level, I can tell you we have some reports that Iran has provided money, 
weapons-mostly in the west, in the Heart area .to the Taliban to fight Daesh”.35  In 
2011 William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary highlighted the fact that British 
SAS soldiers had seized a convoy carrying Iranian built 122mm rockets destined for 
the Taliban36. The deepening of ties was also made evident by the Taliban’s move to 
open an office in Iran.37. In May 2015, Tayab Agha, the leading figure of the 
Taliban’s office in Qatar led a high profile delegation to Teheran seeking support. The 
intensified interactions between Taliban leaders and Iran can be traced back to the 
former’s will to decrease dependence on Pakistan and find other sources of support.38 
                                                
34 “US House Rejects Imposing Stricter Limits on Aid to Pakistan.” The Express 
Tribune, June 11, 2015. http://tribune.com.pk/story/901892/us-house-rejects-
imposing-stricter-limits-on-aid-to-pakistan/.  
35 Seitz, Blake. “Gen. Campbell: Iran Is Arming the Taliban.” Free Beacon, October 
6, 2015. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/gen-campbell-iran-is-arming-the-
taliban/.  
36 Farmer, Ben. “Taliban Opens Office in Iran.” The Telegraph, August 1, 2012. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9444402/Taliban-opens-
office-in-Iran.html.  
37 Ibidem 
38 Azamy, Hekmatullah, and Abubakar Siddique. “Taliban Reach out to Iran.” The 
Jamestown Foundation, June 12, 2015. 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?cHash=5221edca1a5176c2d16dfc1a7
8631a6f&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44029#.VjtWXGSrTaZ.  
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In addition Iran is exploiting the plight of the approximately 1 million Afghani 
refugees for its own geopolitical agenda. The Islamic Republic has embarked on a 
campaign of training these refugees and sending them off to fight in support of 
President Bashar al-Assad.39 Leaked U.S. government cables have also shown that 
Iran routinely applies pressure on Afghani politicians to back anti-U.S. policies and 
raise anti-U.S. interventions and talking points in parliamentary sessions.40 
 
It appears Iran is adopting strategy similar to the one of Pakistan. First, Iran is 
interested in a regime in Kabul that is not opposed to Tehran’s regional aspirations, 
since both are intertwined geographically. Second, the Islamic Republic is convinced 
that the Taliban will be a key actor in any future governance configuration of 
Afghanistan, and thus supporting the Taliban should be evaluated on the basis of 
Iran’s determination to influence, direct or even control the Taliban. Third, both resort 
to using terrorist non-state actors as tactical assets in the region. The billions of 
dollars, which will certainly be available to Iran due to the implications of sanctions 
relief as part of the nuclear deal, will provide the country with additional funds to 
promote its regional aspirations.41 
 
5. India, a vital actor in Afghanistan 
 
Although India had a favourable position in Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath 
of Operation Enduring Freedom due to the fact it had close ties to key elites of the 
victorious Northern Alliance, influence decreased over time as the US chose Pakistan 
                                                
39 Stancati, Margherita. “Iran Backs Taliban with Cash and Arms.” The Wall Street 
Journal, June 11, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backs-taliban-with-cash-
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40 Ahmad, Javid. “The Enemy of Iran’s Enemy in Afghanistan: Tehran’s Growing 
Ties with the Taliban.” Foreign Affairs, June 21, 2015. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2015-06-21/enemy-irans-enemy-
afghanistan.  
41 Nasib, Atta. “Iran’s Dangerous Liaison with the Taliban.” Gandhara, June 26, 2015. 
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as its main node on the War on Terror.42 The worst-case scenario for Indian policy 
makers was to witness Pakistani hegemony in Afghanistan, resulting in the creation of 
an Islamabad-controlled client regime, which would allow the Pakistani security 
apparatus to revamp its military presence on the border with India.43 New Delhi was 
thus concerned that a strong Pakistani strategic footprint would rekindle ties with the 
Taliban 44. 
As India’s involvement started growing in Afghanistan so to was Pakistan’s will to 
curb Indian engagement in its backyard. The Iraq war in 2003 diverted the attention of 
the US. Pakistan utilized the re-emergence of the Taliban as a welcome entry point to 
re-establish itself as the prime partner for Washington in the War on Terror as well as 
foster its ties with violent non-state proxy elements.45 India lost its standing in the 
Afghan peace negotiations whereas Pakistan “positioned itself as a vital player in any 
Afghan reconciliation process”.46 The disjuncture between India’s position and that of 
other nations became evident at a 60-nation London conference on Afghanistan in 
2010, where New Delhi was alone on its ‘zero-tolerance’ stance towards the 
                                                
42 Chauduri, Rudra. “Dealing with the Endgame: India and the Af-Pak Puzzle.” In 
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International, 2012,p.206. 
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Macmillan, 
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44 Yadav, Vikash, and Conrad Barwa. “Relational Control: India’s Grand Strategy in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.” India Review, April-June 2011, 10, no. 2, p.117 
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Implications.” In India in Africa and Afghanistan. Nova Science Publishers Inc, 
2013,p.48. 
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Taliban.47 Pant attributes the dwindling perception amongst international stakeholders 
that India should play a more pro-active role in Afghanistan to successful Pakistani 
lobbying: 
“So when London decided that the time had come to woo the ‘moderate’ section of 
the Taliban back to share power in Kabul, it was a signal to India that Pakistan 
seemed to have convinced the West that it could play the role of mediator in 
negotiations with the Taliban-thereby underlining its centrality in the unfolding 
strategic dynamic in the region.” 48 
 
Despite the fact that reducing Pakistan’s influence is still a core issue and essential to 
India’s regional approach, it should not be reduced to and only seen in the light of 
Indo-Pak rivalry. India has also reanimated the commitment towards its regional role 
as a benign dominant power investing in social and economic development of its 
immediate neighbourhood, reminiscent of the ’Gujral doctrine’ of the mid 1990s.49  
With aid to Afghanistan amounting to ca. US$2 billion, India is the fifth largest donor 
internationally, and the largest regionally.50 By demonstrating its capability to act as a 
major donor “India is trying to project itself as a significant economic power that can 
provide necessary aid to the needy states in its neighbourhood.51 After Karzai took 
over the first government after the ouster of the Taliban regime, Indian strategic 
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48 Ibidem 
49 Price, Gareth. “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan.” Asia ASP 2013/04. Chatham 
House, August 2013,p.4. 
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rationale was aimed at generating goodwill amongst the population, also building on 
its ‘soft power’ capacities52  
 
“Making India less visible in Afghanistan, without reducing its influence has be- 
come a priority for policy makers in Delhi. India has expanded its delivery of what 
one observer has called “Phantom Aid”, whereby money is channelled through the 
Afghan government to local communities. These Small Development Projects (SDPs) 
ensure greater local ownership and participation and, according to Ministry of 
External Affairs, militants have targeted none of the SDPs. Programmed oversight 
provided by consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Heart enables 
India to cultivate direct links with the communities involved”53 
In comparison to other international donors, mostly OECD countries, India has 
pursued a rather unique reconstruction and development programme in Afghanistan 
that favours indigenous projects and actors: 
“Most of India’s aid is delivered through the Afghan government, unlike other 
international donors, who have relied on their own agencies, provincial 
reconstruction teams and subcontracting, thereby creating parallel structures of 
governance while doing little to extend the writ of the Afghan government.”54 
Currently India’s hallmark infrastructure projects, the building of the Afghan 
parliament in Kabul and the Salma Dam in Herat are nearing completion. The former 
will soon provide Afghan MPs with a building, which is needed to further promote 
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and institutionalize democracy. The Dam will augment the possibilities of 
electrification in rural and urban Herat.55 
To sum up, Afghanistan forms the heart piece of India’s Central Asia strategy, as it 
provides much needed connectivity to the landlocked countries. India is a strong 
promoter of regional peace and stability and after pushing the inclusion of 
Afghanistan into SAARC in 2007; it has further gone down the path of regional 
integration and developmental aid. The most important point however, is that India is 
the only country in the region with a democratic track record, one that can support 
and sustain Afghanistan’s transition towards democratization. The fact that New 
Delhi has always emphasized an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process has 
garnered much goodwill in Kabul, an essential ingredient for future cooperation.  
 
6. The danger of spill over effects into Central Asia 
 
Three days before the Taliban capture of Kunduz, the “Islamic Jihad Union” (IJU), 
which is affiliated with the Taliban and al Qaeda and that has recently also sworn 
allegiance to the Islamic State56, proclaimed that it controlled large swaths of the 
Afghani border with Tajikistan. The jihadist group posted several pictures 
demonstrating the ease in which it crossed into Tajikistan during broad daylight.57 
 
The great fear of many officials from Afghanistan as well as Central Asia is that the 
once relatively peaceful eight provinces bordering Central Asia could turn into a 
hotbed for the Taliban, violent Islamist CAR groups and the Islamic State Khorasan. 
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5859The ultimate goal of jihadists with ethnic ties to CAR states is to conquer central 
Asia and establish an Islamic Caliphate. Kunduz and other recent conquests in the 
northeastern Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Kunar and Nuristan, appear to have 
been singled out by the Taliban and its allies as the ideal hub for destabilizing Central 
Asian States by sending fighters, money, narcotics and weapons through the porous 
border regions.60 
 
 
Afghan Farmers Stand Together Against Drug Production in Northern Marjah61 
 
Groups such as the Islamic movement Uzbekistan (IMU) have been successful in 
obtaining support from the Taliban, while also swearing allegiance to IS Khorasan in 
Afghanistan. The attack on Kunduz, in which hundreds of Central Asian Islamists 
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militants assisted the Taliban in conquering the northern city, demonstrated the degree 
of communication as well as strategic and tactical cooperation.62 
 
The start of operation Zarb-e-Azb in Waziristan by Pakistan’s armed forces, where 
many terrorists had settled with their families along the porous Afghanistan - Pakistan 
border, is one of the main factors that lead to the influx of foreign fighters into 
Afghanistan’s Northern regions, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan. Violent Islamic militancy was not eradicated by the operation, but 
merely started shifting from one Afghani border region to the next.63  
 
A further troubling aspect of Central Asian Islamic militancy in Afghanistan is the 
deadly impact on minority communities. In May 2015 IMU terrorists located in Zabul 
province abducted 31 civilians from the Shiite Hazara minority. This incident is not 
an exception any more. In addition to supporting the Taliban, various terrorist outlets 
have resorted to sectarian violence, reminiscent of the atrocities committed in Iraq.64 
 
Narcotic trafficking is one of the key financing schemes that enables both the Taliban 
in Afghanistan as well as Central Asian jihadists to uphold their operational 
capacities. With increasing cross-border concentration of terrorist activities the impact 
of drug trade will rise significantly. Uncontrolled Central Asian border areas such as 
the Shurabad district in the southwest of Tajikistan, enable the swift transfer of drugs 
and drug money, which are the lifeline of Islamist operations in the region.65 
 
Creating immediate gains in this realm from the outside is not an easy task. There 
have however been some initiatives established or funded by the EU that when 
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tweaked according to the realities on the ground could bear positive results in the 
future. The fight against drug trafficking and border control impacts Afghanistan as 
well as CAR states and both are intertwined. It would be hard to find experts claiming 
otherwise. Therefore it is somewhat surprising that expired programmes such as the 
“Border Management Programme in Central Asia” (BOMCA: 2003-2014), which 
supported the modernisation and reform of border management or the “Central Asia 
Drug Action Programme” (CADAP: 2010-2013) that aimed to reduce the demand for 
illegal drug substances, included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, but excluded Afghanistan.66 
 
In addition the “Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre” 
(CARICC), which is funded by several EU member states and aims to coordinate 
joint actions for combatting illicit drug trafficking includes the five Central Asian 
States, Azerbaijan and Russia, but not Afghanistan.67 
 
In order to be able to assist authorities from CARs and Afghanistan the EU should 
continue funding programmes such as the UNDP’s “Border Management Northern 
Afghanistan” (BOMNAF 2010-2014) that have put an emphasis on creating CAR-
Afghanistan linkages and confidence building measures in the realm of border 
security, drug management and law enforcement.68 Furthermore it should continue to 
promote, i.e. re-launch the expired initiatives BOMCA and CADAP- demanding the 
inclusion of Afghani stakeholders. 
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7. How Negotiations helped the Resurgence of the Taliban 
 
No matter how shocking the Taliban advancement on Kunduz might appear, it is the 
logical consequence of an entrenched insurgency that has been becoming more 
violent and bold since the announcement of ISAF troop withdrawal. Safe zones are no 
longer safe, once peaceful regions have been marred by violence and instability, 
ethnic minorities and women are in constant danger, and the Afghan National Unity 
Government (NUG) and its security forces have been overwhelmed by sophisticated 
attacks and recruitment mechanisms of the Taliban, Central Asian terrorist groups and 
increasingly also IS Khorasan. The loss of Kunduz not only showed the Taliban’s 
ability to entrench itself beyond its rural strongholds, it also caused a severe blow to 
the national psyche and confidence in the NUG and the Afghan security forces.69 
 
 2015 has surpassed 2014 in terms of violence, and is now already the bloodiest year 
since 2001. What Kunduz demonstrated is that terrorist groups now have the 
capacities to hold territories and not only destabilize them. After the announcement of 
Mullah Omar’s death in the end of July 2015, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, a narco-
trafficker and an apprentice of the Pakistani intelligence service with strong links to 
the al Qaida-affiliated Haqqani network is now leading the Taliban in a violent 
campaign to overthrow the ANU and establish an Islamic Caliphate.70  
 
Unfortunately it is highly unlikely that Kunduz will remain an isolated incident. US 
Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart stated that in 2015 
the insurgency would “again attempt to increase its influence […] operate in larger 
formation, and continue to test security forces by temporarily seizing a number of 
vulnerable rural Afghan checkpoints and district centers”. The director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper added that the ANSF are in dire need of long-term 
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international support in the counterinsurgency against the Taliban and other insurgent 
formations.71 
 
The Taliban and its allies are very aware of the fact the NUG is extremely dependent 
on Western aid, personnel and equipment. And they have used withdrawal dates 
declared by Western leaders, to regroup and rearm, creating a false semblance of 
calm. They face far fewer airstrikes due to the ISAF drawdown; the Afghani Air 
Force is practically non-existent. Furthermore the Afghan National Army (ANA) 
lacks heavy armoured vehicles and armaments and the Taliban often offer better pay 
than Afghani security forces can provide.72  
 
The Afghani dependence on foreign aid and a stalling economy play into the hands of 
the Taliban. External donor funding comprises over 70 per cent of the national 
budget.73 With decreasing Western presence, both financially and logistically, the 
Taliban feel no pressure to compromise and curtail their long-term strategy of 
overthrowing the government. Dwindling support leads to a deterioration of overall 
security and the ability to provide basic goods, services and employment 
opportunities to Afghanistan’s population. This in turn will eventually disgruntle 
certain sections of Afghani society and the success of the Taliban coating themselves 
in the robes of rabble-rousers will increase significantly. The troop withdrawal from 
Afghanistan started to soon. A stable environment was not present and the Taliban 
had not been defeated. Providing the Taliban with concrete timetables of reducing 
troop levels only helped their cause in becoming more capable. The following three 
charts below show a distinct positive correlation between troop withdrawal and 
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civilian deaths, deaths of Afghani security personnel as well as attacks in Kabul and a 
decrease of ISAF troops.  
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will actually be able to provide given the cuts and diminished 
troop numbers it is already facing as of 2014.155 While serving 
as COMISAF in Afghanistan, General John Campbell 
RSQDRRDCHMQDL@QJRHM.BSNADQSG@SFHUDMSGDMTLADQ
of platforms that we have, the amount of ISR [Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance], the amount of CAS [close air 
support], the amount of med-evac we’ll have will be greatly 
CHLHMHRGDCEQNLVG@SVDG@UDSNC@X156 The ANSF has not 
yet attained these capacities. Afghan security forces will need 
to rely on lingering U.S. and NATO Forces capabilities as well 
as training and assistance programs in the next several years 
in order to meet the growing threats posed by the Taliban.
Attrition Rates
,@INQQDBQTHSLDMSDÇNQSRRHMBDG@UDDWO@MCDCSGD -2%
to its greatest size and strength yet. January 2014 assessments 
put ANSF size at just under the fully authorized level at 
352,000 personnel, mostly divided into ANA and ANP, with 
an additional 37,000 personnel in ALP.157 However, a SIGAR 
report from March 2015 indicated that the Afghan National 
Army troop numbers declined eleven percent from January 
to November 2014, reducing their force to around 169,000 
from the optimal force strength of 195,000.158 Several 
factors threaten ANSF’s ability to maintain these numbers 
with less international coalition assistance and coordination 
HMHSRQDBQTHSLDMSDÇNQSR3GD -2%BNMSHMTDRSNE@BDGHFG
attrition rates from a combination of high casualty, desertion, 
and annual withdrawal numbers.
Casualty rates are the chief cause of the current ANSF attrition 
concern. General John Campbell noted in a February 12, 
 AQHDMF SN SGD 2DM@SD  QLDC 2DQUHBDR "NLLHSSDD
SG@S SGD GHFG B@RT@KSX Q@SD G@R @KQD@CX G@C @M HLO@BS NM
BNLA@S QD@CHMDRR@MC SG@S HSVHKKONRD BG@KKDMFDR SN ENQBD
CDUDKNOLDMS NUDQ SHLD159 &DMDQ@K "@LOADKK RODBHB@KKX
observed that the ANSF’s operational tempo was four times 
higher in 2014 than in 2013.160 As ANSF took on increasing 
leadership roles in operations, its personnel assumed a larger 
burden of casualties. This alone does not account for the 
numerous factors arising from the end of the international 
coalition’s combat mission that have created a more 
dangerous operating environment for Afghan security forces. 
The increased necessity and duration of ANSF-led ground 
operations, coupled with lesser capabilities, less protective 
equipment, and less frequent assistance from international 
forces, has left ANSF personnel a greater target for Taliban 
attacks.161 
Former IJC Commander Lieutenant General Joseph 
 MCDQRNM@KRNB@KKDCSGD -2%B@RT@KSXMTLADQRMNS
RTRS@HM@AKDHMSGDKNMFQTMATSR@HCSGDXVDQDDWODBSDCFHUDM
SGDGHFGDQQNKDSGDXUDOK@XDC@MCVGDQDSGDXUDADDM162 This 
higher casualty rate is partially due to the change in Taliban 
tactics in targeting ANSF personnel and the presence of larger 
Taliban gatherings for attacks across multiple provinces. The 
dearth of current medical facilities and med-evac capabilities 
in Afghanistan further exacerbates this issue. In 2014 at 
least 5,400 Afghan police and army personnel were killed 
in action, a 6.5% jump over the previous year’s rate.163 This 
toll increased even as the number of Taliban-initiated attacks 
actually decreased from 24,000 in 2013 to some 18,000 
in 2014 according to ISAF Joint Command.164 The ANSF 
has taken steps to reduce these casualty rates by focusing on 
improving protection against explosives and boosting its 
med-evac and medical care abilities.165 
 KNMF VHSG GHFG B@RT@KSHDR SGD  -2% HR G@UHMF CHÈBTKSX
retaining soldiers. The heavy losses indicated in the March 
2015 SIGAR report were due not only to combat deaths but 
also to discharges and desertion among the army’s ranks.166 
These losses, combined with equipment and pay shortages, 
have created a morale crisis within ANSF. Desertion 
rates among the national police have gone up as well.167 In 
November 2014, ISAF reported that the ANSF was aiming 
for a goal of 1.2 percent AWOL rates between the ANA and 
SGD -/VHSG +/MTLADQRLNQDCHÈBTKS SNO@QRDNTS168 
Several reports on the ground say pay shortages and delays are 
major causal factors for ALP defections,169 and local media 
reported in November 2014 some Afghan security personnel 
have resorted to selling their weapons and ammunition to the 
Taliban in order to make ends meet.170 
The Department of Defense report in October 2014 
@BJMNVKDCFDCSGDCHÈBTKSNTSKNNJENQUHBSNQXNUDQSGD3@KHA@M
Total Casualties by Year. Source: Watson, “As ar Looms, US Warns Afghan 
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"GHIBOT
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shadow governance institutions relating to taxation, 
education, and Shari‘a-based law and order. The above map 
highlights districts that witnessed massed Taliban attacks or 
demonstrable action by Taliban shadow governments in 2014 
to show concentrations of activity and growing support. The 
above map indicates that the Taliban has been able to exert 
HMTDMBD @MC BNMCTBS @SS@BJR SGQNTFGNTS K@QFD RV@SGR HM
the eastern and southern sections of the country. It has also 
managed to increase its presence in Afghanistan’s northern 
region, and thereby extend the insurgency’s national reach. 
In so doing, the Taliban positioned itself for multiple follow-
on opportunities across the political and military spectrum 
in 2015.
One of the best metrics in 2014 to demonstrate increasing 
Taliban activity across Afghanistan is civilian casualties (see 
chart below.) The United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) civilian casualty report from February 
 HMCHB@SDR @ RHFMHB@MS HMBQD@RD HM BHUHKH@M B@RT@KSHDR
from ground engagement between anti-government forces 
and the ANSF throughout all regions of Afghanistan.20 For 
the northern, northeastern, and western regions, civilian 
casualties from ground engagements in 2014 doubled 
as compared to 2013. Civilian casualties from ground 
engagements nearly tripled for the southern region.21 
Taliban activities in Afghanistan’s peripheral territories are 
RHFMHB@MSSNSGDNUDQ@KKRS@AHKHSXNESGDRS@SD-NS@AKD3@KHA@M
activity occurred in four separate Taliban systems, including 
the southern region, the eastern provinces, Kabul, and the 
Afghan north. An increased Taliban presence in rural areas in 
2014 allowed the Taliban to develop safe-havens and launch 
attacks against more precious targets, including Kabul. This 
report will examine the Taliban’s activities in each region in 
late 2014. 
The rise in Taliban activity in 2014 was likely event-driven. 
The Taliban’s leadership viewed the political turmoil that 
RTQQNTMCDC  EFG@MHRS@MR OQDRHCDMSH@K QTMNÇ DKDBSHNMR NM
June 14, 2014 as an opportunity to establish greater control of 
SDQQ@HMHMD@QKX@BBNQCHMFSN EFG@MRDBTQHSXNÈBH@KR22 
The insurgency not only escalated attacks, but also sought 
to drive the ANSF from the countryside. According to an 
@MNMXLNTRGHFGQ@MJHMF EFG@MRDBTQHSXNÈBH@KSGD3@KHA@M
had initially planned to undertake an aggressive strategy 
in 2015 and capitalize on the withdrawal of U.S. combat 
forces.23 Kabul in particular remains an attractive target for 
Taliban attacks for its symbolic value and high visibility. The 
nation-wide resurgence in Taliban activity suggests that the 
Taliban will continue to capitalize on any drawdown to launch 
ever more deadly attacks against Western and Afghan forces to 
improve their relative position.
/VNCFSPG$JWJMJBO%FBUITBOE*OKVSJFTCZ:FBSBOE3FHJPO4PVSDF"GHIBOJTUBO"OOVBM3FQPSU1SPUFDUJPOPG$JWJMJBOTJO"SNFE$POJDU6OJUFE
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, February 2015.
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 McNally, Lauren, and Paul Bucula. “The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security.” 
Afghanistan Report. Institute for the Study of War (ISW), March 2015,p.19. 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AFGH%20Report.pdf. 
 
 
In addition to the detrimental impact of dwindling ISAF forces and funding, a further 
reason for the resurgence of the Taliban lies in the flawed perception that a group 
such as the Taliban, which vehemently opposes the notion of human rights, civic 
rights, democracy, minority rights and women’s rights, could be brought to reason or 
that distinctions between “moderate” and “good Taliban” can be made. Former 
President Hamid Karzai was willing to make huge concessions to the Taliban: from 
the group’s leaders with a share in the government, to funding, or releasing thousands 
of prisoners and even offering to oust anti-Taliban and pro-Western elements from his 
party and cabinet. Even these concessions that were handed to the terrorist group did 
not end violence or hinder the Taliban in its attempt to enlarge its influence by 
reaching out to al Qaeda and Central Asian terrorist outlets.74 
 
 
                                                
74 Majidyar, Ahmad. “Negotiating with the Taliban: Lessons from History.” American 
Enterprise Institute, May 1, 2014. http://www.aei.org/publication/negotiating-with-
the-taliban-lessons-from-history/.  
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The Kabul Attack Network attacked symbols of the central 
FNUDQMLDMS HM @M @OO@QDMS DÇNQS SN RBNQD OQNO@F@MC@
victories. Insurgent commanders likely recognize that 
spectacular attacks in Kabul attract more attention from 
foreign media than ground operations in the periphery. In 
demonstrating that they still have the ability to escalate attacks 
in the capital, the insurgency is likely trying to embarrass 
Western militaries during the withdra al of U.S. and NATO 
forces. The militants have another presumed goal as well: 
to raise the cost for Western organizations to operate in 
Afghanistan. With attacks against Western targets mounting, 
NGOs, foreign businesses, and even foreign governments 
might be forced to restrict their presence and subsequently 
their support to the Afghan government. The uptick of 
@SS@BJRQDONQSDCKXB@TRDCRNLD-&.RSNOTKK SGDHQRS@ÇNTS
early ahead of the winter holidays.103
The escalation of violence in Kabul is likely linked to the 
increase of Taliban activity in the periphery. As ISAF troops 
closed their forward operating bases and pulled back to 
provincial capitals in the transition to Resolute Support, 
the insurgency was able to operate with greater freedom of 
movement and consolidate pre-existing strongholds in areas 
around Kabul. The insurgency maintains safe-havens in 
areas abutting three major highways leading into Kabul. The 
3@KHA@MB@METMMDKVD@ONMRETMCR@MCFGSDQREQNLSGDRD
areas and along the highways in order to support operations 
in Kabul. The Taliban’s ability to reinforce the Kabul Attack 
-DSVNQJ HR L@CD D@RHDQ AX @M HMDÇDBSHUD  -2% OQDRDMBD
around the capital. With their limited capabilities, Afghan 
forces are reportedly struggling to maintain an adequate 
level of security on the roadways leading into Kabul. In a 
meeting with lawmakers on December 17, 2014, NDS chief 
Rahma ullah Nabil said that the ANSF can monitor only four 
of the twenty six access points into Kabul.104 
The Taliban have also ramped up IED attacks in the capital, the 
vast majority of which have targeted military and government 
convoys. In particular, the insurgency has increased its use 
NERSHBJXANLARNQ CGDRHUD$WOKNRHUD#DUHBDR  $#R HM
targeting military vehicles. Most of the successful IED and 
AED attacks have targeted ANSF vehicles, particularly ANA 
buses, rather than ISAF or RSM units. This is probably due 
to the ANSF’s lower operational security. Taliban operatives 
likely also wish to reserve their more spectacular SVBIED 
and suicide vest (SVEST) attacks against foreign targets. 
Nevertheless, the surge in IED and AED usage among the 
Kabul Attack Network poses a consid rable threat to the 
activity of international groups in Kabul, as evidenced by 
the November 24, 2014 IED attack against an ISAF convoy, 
which resulted in the deaths of two ISAF soldiers.105 
When compared to vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices, IEDs are relatively easier to construct so insurgents 
can conduct IED attacks at a lower cost. IED systems also 
Number of Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Week. Source: Data from open sources collected by Institute for the Study of War. Contact 
ISW for more information.
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In February 2015 Ghani was still under the impression that “the grounds for peace 
have never been better in the last 36 years”.75 In the aftermath of this statement 
Taliban officials claimed they would initiate the largest spring offensive ever in 
Afghanistan. While Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah were contemplating on how best to 
engage with the Taliban in talks, the terrorist group was committing targeted killings 
of judges, prosecutors and civilian government workers.76  It is reassuring that the 
current Afghani government, which has been outmanoeuvred several times in the 
past, has finally realized how futile attempts of reconciliation with the Taliban are. In 
the second week of October 2015, Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah 
Abdullah rejected an offer from Pakistan to reinitiate negotiations with the Taliban, 
only a few months after the recent round of failed talks in Urumqi, China.77 
 
In a cabinet meeting on October 12, 2015 Abdullah Abdullah reiterated his stance of 
not negotiating with the Taliban by stating “This is good talk, but in reality we expect 
that [Pakistan] will cut off its [covert] aid to the Taliban […] If they don't receive 
outside help they will not be able to run grand-scale [military] operations."78 
                                                
75 Capaccio, Tony, and Kartikay Mehrotra. “Taliban Set to Gain in Afghanistan, U.S. 
Intelligence Chief Says.” Bloomberg Business, February 26, 2015. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/taliban-set-to-gain-in-
afghanistan-u-s-intelligence-chief-says.  
76 The Taliban has claimed responsibility for 48 incidents of targeted killings, 
including deliberate killings of tribal elders, judges, prosecutors and civilian 
Government workers in the first three months of 2015. Fore more see: UN News 
Centre. “Afghan Civilian Casualties from Ground Combat Rise in 2015-UN.” United 
Nations, April 12, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50553#.VkMYdGSrS1s.  
77 “The Afghan government held a formal meeting with the Taliban in Urumqi, China 
in late May 2015. Moreover, the Taliban was apparently delivered to the negotiating 
table by the Pakistani intelligence agency the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), a 
development at least partially validating Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan. The Taliban 
negotiators who attended were all believed to be closely linked to the ISI, and ISI 
officials were present at the meeting” (quoted from: Wong, Edward, and Mujib 
Mashal. “Taliban and Afghan Officials Have Secret Talks in China.” New York 
Times, May 25, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/world/asia/taliban-and-
afghan-peace-officials-have-secret-talks-in-china.html. ) 
78 Siddique, Abubakar, and Abdul Hal Kakar. “Why Are the Taliban Ascendant in 
Afghanistan?” Gandhara, October 15, 2015. 
http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-why-are-the-taliban-
ascendant/27307688.html.  
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What Peter Neumann, the director of the highly esteemed “International Centre for 
the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence” and his co-authors wrote in their 
report “Talking to the Taliban-Hope over History?” in 2013 still precisely describes 
the state of play revolving around attempts of negotiating with the Taliban in 2015:  
 
“Talks with the Taliban have been characterised by wishful thinking, bad timing and 
poor management. Some advocates of talks have overstated their case by stressing the 
‘ripeness’ of the Taliban for a deal […] The strategic rationale for talks has never 
been clear. Those who have advocated talks with the Taliban have done so for 
different reasons at different times. Some hoped to ‘peel off’ low-level insurgents, 
whereas others preferred to encourage the development of a, Taliban political party; 
some hoped to divide the movement, whereas others hoped to massage it in such a 
way that Taliban ‘doves’ were strengthened over ‘hawks’ the reality is that the 
Taliban leadership appears to believe that in any negotiations in which they might 
engage, they will be operating from a position of strength and momentum. The most 
important factor is that all parties are positioning themselves for this new 
dispensation: this is the game changer, rather than some moment of moderate 
‘awakening’ within the insurgency. There is scant evidence that the Taliban 
movement is moderating its overall aims, or its methods. Instead, it seems that they 
are adopting a form of ‘talk-fight’ […]. If anything, as the prospect of talks has so 
have their violent activities.”79 
An additional point of concern is that the Taliban were never included either in the 
“list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts” of the EU or in the 
“Foreign Terrorist Organisation” designation of the US.80 Some US top-officials 
declarations go as far as to explicitly consider Taliban activities merely as an 
“insurgency” rather than as “terrorism”. This is in defiance of the clear terminology 
                                                
79 Neumann, Peter, John Bew, Martyn Frampton, and Marisa Porges. “Talking to the 
Taliban-Hope over History?” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation 
and Political Violence (ICSR), 2013, p.45-46. http://icsr.info/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/ICSR-TT-Report.pdf.  
80 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1334&qid=1440691334018&from=EN 
and http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm: 
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used by consecutive UN Security Council Resolutions, where the activities of 
Afghanistan’s Taliban are consistently described as support or practice of terrorism 
from its earliest resolution  (1267/1999) up to the most recent one (2160/2014)81. 
Whereas the split of the resolutions addressing the Taliban (1988/2011) and Al-Qaeda 
(1989/2011) are most likely aimed at facilitating the delisting of some Taliban leaders 
who are involved in international negotiations by the Sanctions Committee, the strong 
verbal stance condemning Taliban terrorist activities was not changed.82 The State 
Department’s position is the US official position, but notwithstanding it is also in 
clear contradiction with the position of the US Treasury that considers the Taliban 
activities as terrorist, and a direct threat to the US interests.83 
The international community has to come to terms with the fact that the Taliban are 
not a negotiating partner that can be trusted or one that seems willing or capable of 
changing its agenda. The core of its tenets diametrically opposes the concept of 
democracy and human rights. There is also no feasible pragmatism behind sitting at 
the table with the Taliban. There have been no tangible net gains, only losses. The 
terrorist group has instrumentalized negotiations in the past to plan attacks and 
increase its outreach and recruiting schemes. Instead of engaging in talks that only 
make the adversary stronger, it should increase its commitment of supporting the 
ANU by providing much needed logistical and physical supplies. It should push for 
                                                
81 “Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular 
the on-going violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other 
violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups, criminals and those involved in 
terrorism and the illicit brokering in arms and related material and arms trafficking in 
the production, trafficking or trade of illicit drugs, and the strong links between 
terrorism and insurgency activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local 
population, including women, children, national security forces and international 
military and civilian personnel, including humanitarian and development workers”  
See full Resolution text: United Nations Security Council. “Security Council Adopts 
Two Resolutions, Extending Mandates of Groups Monitoring Sanctions Regimes 
against Al-Qaida, Taliban,” June 17, 2014. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11440.doc.htm. ) 
82 See http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1988(2011) 
83 See the “National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment 2015” in 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Risk%20Assessment%2
0%E2%80%93%2006-12-2015.pdf. The report quotes extensive drugs and arms trade 
deals used to finance terrorist activities of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Most of these 
deals pass through the US territory.   
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stricter and improved border controls and sanction the actions of Pakistan’s military 
establishment that aim at misappropriating the Taliban as a tactical asset against India. 
 
8. Women under attack in Afghanistan 
 
The recent stoning to death of a young woman in the village of Ghalmeen, in Ghor 
province on 3rd November 2015 once again viciously demonstrated the barbaric 
disdain the Taliban has for over 50 per cent of the population in Afghanistan. The 19-
year-old Rokhshana was killed on the basis of a sentence handed down to tribal elders 
by a Taliban court, which had charged the young woman with adultery.84 
 
 
Young women demanding justice for Women and for Farkhunda85 
 
                                                
84 BBC. “Afghan Woman Accused of Adultery Is Stoned to Death,” November 3, 
2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34714205.  
85 Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/phototoday2008/21054283231/ 
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There had been some hope that violence against women would decrease after the 
nation-wide protests in the aftermath of the murder of Farkhunda, an Islamic female 
scholar, who had been amongst many things, uncovering hate-speech and violence of 
several mullahs. The courts however dropped several charges against the perpetrators 
and most of the men that had been part of the mob that killed Farkhunda have not 
been brought to justice.86  
 
In the first half of 2015 the UNAMA documented a rise of children casualties by 13 
per cent and a 23 per cent increase in the number of women killed or injured 
compared with the same time period in 2014.87 UN officials have urged all parties, 
but particularly the Taliban to “cease attacks against people who are not taking direct 
part in hostilities”.88 
 
Women live in a state of constant fear in Afghanistan. Improvements made in the 
realms of political participation (27.7 per cent of MPs are female), life expectancy 
(increase from 56 to 62 from 2001-2012), decrease of maternal mortality (from 49.4 
in 2000 to 17.9 per cent in 2013) as well as the establishment of Afghanistan’s first 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs in 2001 are important steps in the right direction, but 
have not fundamentally changed the precarious living conditions of Afghanistan’s 
women.89  
 
                                                
86 Nordland, Rod. “Afghan Panel to Call for Retrial in Death of Farkhunda, a Female 
Scholar.” New York Times, August 12, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/world/asia/farkhunda-afghanistan-retrial.html.  
87 Rasmussen, Sune Engel. “Afghanistan: Sharp Rise in Women and Children 
Casualities in First Half of 2015.” The Guardian, August 5, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/05/afghanistan-sharp-rise-women-
children-casualties-2015-taliban.  
88 UN News Centre. “Afghan Civilian Casualties from Ground Combat Rise in 2015-
UN.” United Nations, April 12, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50553#.VkMYdGSrS1s 
89 OXFAM. “Behind Closed Doors: The Risk of Denying Women a Voice in 
Determining Afghanistan’s Future.” Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 24, 2014, p.6-
7. https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp200-behind-
doors-afghan-women-rights-241114-en.pdf.  
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Furthermore, legal securities very rarely manifest themselves in every day life. 
Although there is a legal ban on child marriage, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health 
calculated that in 2012, 21 per cent of girls were married by the age of fifteen. 30 per 
cent of civil servant positions are to be occupied by women; however women are 
often hired and fired or excluded from promotion. Female victims of sexual violence 
or human trafficking are technically protected by the law, but are more often than not 
charged with moral crimes or indecency and sent to jail. “Despite formal guarantees, 
the courts and society at large still act within the framework of conservative social 
norms that restrict women’s rights in economic and political spheres” These 
restrictions include limitations on women’s free movement as well as on rights to 
choose a spouse, divorce, and maintain child custody after a divorce. Lack of 
enforcement of women’s economic rights—including women’s rights to inheritance, 
land, and control over earned income—is widespread because women’s economic 
independence is often not tolerated at the community level.”90 Not only have the 
Taliban lobbied for the eradication of women’s social and legal rights, women’s rights 
in general have never been part of negotiations lead by the international community or 
the Afghani government, because they are very well aware that advancing women’s 
rights is a red line for the Taliban.91 
 
Moreover, in order to silence women advocating for more rights in legal as well as 
practical terms, the Taliban have resorted to assassinations of prominent female 
public figures and politicians. In 2012, Hanifa Safi, the provincial head of Women’s 
Affairs was murdered by a bomb planted under her car and only six months later her 
successor Najia Sidiqi was shot and killed on her way to work.92 In November 2014, 
                                                
90 Hozyainova, Anastasiya. “Sharia and Women’s Rights in Afghanistan.” Special 
Report 347. United States Institute of Peace, May 
2014,p.2.http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR347-
Sharia_and_Women%E2%80%99s_Rights_in_Afghanistan.pdf.  
91 Malikyar, Helana. “Will Women’s Gains Be Sold out in Taliban Peace Deal?” Al 
Jazeera, March 9, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/women-
gains-sold-taliban-peace-deal-150308102938459.html.  
92 OXFAM. “Behind Closed Doors: The Risk of Denying Women a Voice in 
Determining Afghanistan’s Future.” Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 24, 2014,p.8. 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp200-behind-
doors-afghan-women-rights-241114-en.pdf.  
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Shukria Barakzai, a celebrated women’s rights activist and member of parliament 
barely survived a bomb attack directed against her by the Taliban.93 
 
Women’s rights were one of the main drivers justifying the presence of the West in 
Afghanistan. More than $100bn have been invested and incremental progress has 
been made. Leaving now would put all these gains in jeopardy. However certain 
aspects of the modus operandi with regards to women’s rights are unsettling. Women 
have consistently been left out of peace talks with the Taliban. A report by Oxfam 
documented 23 peace talks from 2005 onwards between the international community 
and the Taliban. Women were not present in any of those meetings.94 This creates the 
notion of inconsistency with regards to the West’s normative approach. On the one 
hand proclaiming that women’s rights are sine qua non for the future in Afghanistan, 
on the other hand conducting talks with a group that has always opposed the 
participation of women in society and forbid girls to go to school during its reign of 
terror. Agreeing to sit at the same table with a terrorist group that does not want to 
give a voice to over half of Afghanistan’s population is a practice that should not be 
continued in the future. Selay Ghaffar, a spokesperson of the Solidarity Party 
Afghanistan summarizes the negative impact of this approach: 
 
“They (the International Community) talk about an inclusive process, but they are 
making their own secret deals while pouring dust on our eyes. We don’t even know 
what is being discussed. I have always been meeting with western officials to raise my 
concern about women in Afghanistan. But I feel that we have always been used by the 
international community for their own purposes. When they come here they always 
meet us and we run to them with our concerns. They use the meetings to show the 
                                                
93 Jeong, May. “Kabul Suicide Bombing Wounds Celebrated Female MP.” The 
Guardian, November 16, 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/16/kabul-bombing-targets-female-mp.  
94 See: OXFAM. “Behind Closed Doors: The Risk of Denying Women a Voice in 
Determining Afghanistan’s Future.” Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 24, 2014,  
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp200-behind-
doors-afghan-women-rights-241114-en.pdf. 
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world and say: look, we met with the women of Afghanistan and these are their 
concerns”95 
 
If a sincere approach towards progress for the women in Afghanistan is to commence 
it must exclude talks with the Taliban and instead invite women to build the future of 
their country, while at the same time intensifying efforts to ensure the legal and 
physical protection of Afghanistan’s women. 
 
9. Hazara community: between a rock and a hard place 
 
On 11th November, thousands of Afghanis marched through the streets of Kabul 
carrying the coffins of seven decapitated Shia Hazara, including two women and one 
child. Afghani intelligence confirmed that the murders where committed by the 
Taliban in Zabul province, where intra-group fighting has intensified in the past few 
days.96 
 
Violence against the Hazara, which constitute around 10% of Afghanistan’s 
population, has always been part of the Taliban’s reign of terror. In the 1990s the 
Taliban killed thousands of Hazara in ethnic cleansing campaigns. Several Hazara are 
embarking on the deadly oversee journey to Europe to escape Taliban violence, 
marginalization and endemic poverty. This brain drain has a negative impact on 
nation-and state-building in Afghanistan, since the Hazara have demonstrated positive 
attitudes towards democracy and elections (85 % vote turnout of ethnic Hazara during 
the 2014 elections) and have historically laid a strong emphasis on education.97 
                                                
95 OXFAM. “Behind Closed Doors: The Risk of Denying Women a Voice in 
Determining Afghanistan’s Future.” Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 24, 
2014,p.12.https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp200-
behind-doors-afghan-women-rights-241114-en.pdf. 
96 Agence France-Presse in Kabul. “Kabul Marchers Demand Justice for Seven 
Decapitated Hazaras.” The Guardian, November 11, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/11/kabul-marchers-demand-justice-for-
seven-decapitated-hazaras.  
97 Kusmez, Kevin. “Desperate Journeys: Persecuted Hazara Flee Afghanistan.” Al 
Jazeera, November 1, 2015. 
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Persecution thus, does not only affect the Hazara, but is detrimental to the future of 
Afghanistan.  
 
 
Internally displaced Hazaras98 
 
After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, many Hazara, who had fled to Iran or 
Pakistan, went back to their homeland. Resentment fuelled by the Taliban however 
did not end. In 2011 a suicide bomber in Kabul murdered 56 Shiite worshippers, 
predominantly Hazara, on the holy day of Ashura. One year later the Taliban killed 15 
Hazara civilians traveling in a minibus.99 The rise of IS Khorasan in Afghanistan 
poses a further threat to the livelihood of the Hazara community. IS has violently 
demonstrated how and to which extent it targets minorities in Syria and Iraq. The 
Hazara now face a double threat in Afghanistan. On the one hand they are 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/desperate-journeys-persecuted-
hazara-flee-afghanistan-151026101701042.html.  
98 Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/balazsgardi/6100230316/ 
99 Raghavan, Sudarsan. “After Suffering under the Taliban, An Afghan Minority 
Faces New Threats.” The Washington Post, April 9, 2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/after-suffering-under-the-
taliban-an-afghan-minority-faces-new-threats/2015/04/08/035e1c4a-d71b-11e4-bf0b-
f648b95a6488_story.html.  
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increasingly exposed to rising Taliban violence and on the other hand they are being 
cornered by IS Khorasan. The EU should initiate measures to protect the Hazara. First 
EU officials should acknowledge the threat level Hazara face in Afghanistan and 
refrain from deporting Hazara refugees back to Afghanistan. Second it should urge 
Afghani policy makers to do more to protect its minorities, as they are an essential 
fabric of Afghani society and deserve the same level of protection as every other 
Afghani citizen. 
 
Finally, it needs to be understood that while the Iranian theocracy pretends to be the 
protector of this Shia community it is taking advantage of the dire situation of the 
Hazara in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and has  recruited individuals of this 
minority groups and used them as  cannon fodder in its external adventures in 
Syria.100  
 
10. Confronting the root cause of insecurity in Afghanistan: Jihadi 
Ideology 
 
While maintaining security is essential for Afghanistan and the past has shown the 
positive correlation between more ISAF troops and less attacks, boots on the ground 
will not be enough to put an end to the Taliban’s influence in schools, universities, 
municipalities, courts NGOs etc. Security is necessary in order to provide the 
breathing room to create an effective counter-narrative within Afghanistan’s society, 
but it does not tackle the root cause. It is a remedy, but not the cure. And while the 
urge and potential to create a counter-narrative can be found in so many places in 
Afghanistan, the Taliban have the leverage and the intent to eradicate resistance, from 
all wakes of Afghani society, be it from women, minorities, secularists or individuals 
and groups seeking to establish a more prosperous and just country, in which violent 
jihadism is not the dominant ideology imposed on every day life.  
                                                
100 Agence France-Presse . “Iran Enlists Afghan Refugees as Fighters to Bolster 
Syria’s Bashar Al Assad.” The National, August 26, 2015. 
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The largest religious body in Afghanistan is the National Ulama Council, which was 
set up by President Karzai more than a decade ago. This extremely influential entity 
comprising 3000 Islamic scholars and Mullahs receives government salaries and 
publicly supports the government. Members of the Ulama Council preach government 
support collectively, in statements on television on the radio, or in written form, 
However, in mosques and villages, many clerics tone down pro-government rhetoric 
and often resort to hate-speech against secularists and women and fail to condemn 
attacks on civilians and perpetuate the image of “Western Crusaders” destroying the 
Islamic fabric of Afghanistan.  
 
Mullahs, which have a sincere pro-government stance are singled out by the Taliban 
and put onto kill-lists and assassinated.101 In 2010, 350 members of the Ulama 
Council attempted to force Karzai to implement sharia law, including punishments 
such as death by stoning for adultery. This initiative was launched in the aftermath of 
an execution of a young couple at the hands of the Taliban, which can only be 
understood as an endorsement.102 
 
Osman Bhoran, a contributor and member of the Afghanistan Analysts Network 
summarizes the all-encompassing impact of mullahs in Afghanistan and the 
detrimental implications for the progression towards a peaceful society:  
  
“The mullahs who constitute the majority of the Council still come from 
Afghanistan’s traditional religious establishment and are largely drawn from a 
generation whose religion has become heavily radicalised and politicised during the 
past decades’ civil wars […] they see themselves as the vanguard that defends the 
traditional values and push for their own narrow interpretation of an Islamic state. As 
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an integral part of the broader religious establishment, the Ulama are highly 
influential in their impact on the general atmosphere in the country, setting limits 
even on those rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution and forcing many 
Afghans to self-censor their behaviour. The Council is a major actor in the fight for 
‘cultural’ hegemony in the country between those who want an Islamic state in the 
Islamist sense and those who tend towards the secular, opposing what they would call 
‘Mullahs’ rule’ ”.103 
 
After the murder of Farkhunda, several religious figures went to social media or 
expressed their opinion on television celebrating the righteousness of the atrocity. 
Abdul Rahman Ahmadzai, head of the Awqaf Department of the Ministry of Hajj and 
religious affairs, told a local TV station: 
 
“If this women has really acted against verses of Quran [burnt pages from Quran] 
and she is not a Muslim, we justify the action of the people.”104 
 
Mawlawi Habibullah Hassam of the Bagh-e Bala mosque, the former chairman of the 
Kabul Provincial Council (Facebook): 
 
“Arbitrary execution (mahkama-e sahrayi, literally desert trials) is a necessity that 
must take place: respected khatibs [preachers], Friday sermons should be dedicated 
to this subject. The people can no longer tolerate insults to Islam under this or that 
pretext. A new court has started its work. From today on, the penalty for insulting 
Islam, the Quran and the Prophet is arbitrary execution. The top brass of the state 
supports those hostile to Islam.”105 
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When students and civil society activists called for the end of preaching religious 
extremism in mosques and in universities in Mazar-e-Sharif, the response by a 
prominent mullah was an array of deadly threats: 
 
“I warn those who use this opportunity [the killing of Farkhunda to insult 
ulama]…that women will be killed more heinously than our sister [Farkhunda], and 
many people will be eliminated in a far worse way [if they continue insulting the 
ulama]. Then, nobody will dare raise their voice. … It is also a warning to those who 
create such incidents to have mercy on themselves. Once the nation rises up, nobody 
will be able to stop it. If you value your life, shut your mouths; don’t spread lies 
against the Quran and Islam”106 
 
The reach of mullahs is however not confined to mosques. On 10th November 2015, a 
huge anti-government rally took place at Nangarhar University in eastern Jalalabad 
city. Students waved flags of various jihadi groups and chanted pro-IS and Taliban 
slogans. The overarching goal of the protesters was to call for Islamic Caliphate. One 
of the most active and influential Islamist bodies infiltrating Afghan universities is the 
Jamiat-e-Islah (JeI) group, which advocates a Muslim Brotherhood-style regime. The 
influence runs deep. Its ideology is spread by books, leaflets, recordings, books, and 
seminars but also through active prominent faculty members.107 
 
The proximity of the JeI, but also the Hezb-e-Islami (HeI) to the Muslim Brotherhood 
should not come as a surprise. In the aftermath of the end of Mursi’s reign in Egypt 
large rallies in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Takhar and Nagarhar, comprising mostly of 
young JeI and HeI activists voiced their support for Egypt’s ex-President and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. One of they key figures present was Enyatullah Baligh, a 
former advisor of President Karzai on religious affairs and a key figure of the Ulama 
Council.  
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The JeI and the HeI both aim at establishing an Islamic State by instilling Islamist 
values throughout society and islamise the government through a bottom-up 
approach.108  
 
The Taliban and several radical mullahs within the Ulama Council have managed to 
infiltrate various bodies and institutions of society. Their jihadist outreach is far and 
powerful and they have mastered the art of creating fear within the opposition. The 
West must realise that security alone will not change the violent trajectory of 
Afghanistan and it must fully support those actors that want to transform Afghanistan 
into a peaceful and prosperous nation. 
 
Furthermore the international community must recognise that Jihadi ideology can 
only be countered by an open-minded education. Further enabling girls and women 
access to educational facilities is a first important step. However one core problem 
often remains unaddressed. The fundamentalist ideology of the Taliban is being 
spread through hundreds of madrassas. The Taliban have been very successful in 
eradicating Sufism, which is rooted in Afghanistan, banning the readings of mystic 
scholars and writers such as Rumi, Sanai, and replacing it with puritanical, 
fundamentalist interpretations of Deobandi Islam. 109  In 2011, there were 700 
madrassas registered with the government of Afghanistan.110 But in an interview in 
2015, former Herat Governor Fazlullah Wahidi indicated that in his western province 
alone, there were over 300 unregistered madrassas. The Taliban have managed to 
uphold and nurture their terrorist network through the constant influx of young men, 
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brainwashed by fundamentalist mullahs in madrassas without any oversight. 111 
Although the Taliban suffered high casualties during the ISAF and OEF campaigns, 
they have been able to disseminate jihadism unhindered. Educational oversight must 
also include universities. Bamian University is currently the only institute of higher 
education that is in line with the Ministry of Higher Education’s syllabus. All other 
universities choose their own syllabus and have developed religious studies 
curricula.112 This increases the detrimental impact and propagation of extremist 
views. A solely security-centric focus on nation-building and state-building in 
Afghanistan that does not include establishing an educational system that is unmarred 
by jihadi influence cannot succeed in bringing stability and peace to Afghanistan and 
the region.  
According to this study on radicalisation of the “Afghan Institute for Strategic 
Studies” the students of Bamian University assess the problem as “the general 
ignorance among the people and their tendency to trust the rhetoric of neighboring 
states, especially Iran and Pakistan”113  
Unfortunately this basic wisdom of Afghan students and liberal elites is completely 
ignored by the Western establishment that continues to believe against all clear and 
repeated evidence that the very same countries that are sponsoring Jihadi ideology 
and propagating hate against infidels in general and Western forces based in 
Afghanistan in particular  can be seen as Western allies.114  
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Unless the West understands that the essential battlefield in Afghanistan is ideological 
and that those who spare no efforts in depicting the West as  “agents of doom” cannot 
ever be seen as the allies to bring democracy to the conflict-ridden country, there is no 
hope for the region.   
 
 
11. Policy Recommendations 
 
 
1. The Jihadi ideology of hate and injustice is the Problem that lies at the core of 
Afghanistan’s instability.  Actors to the west and south of Afghanistan have promoted 
this ideology. The Western establishment started supporting and nurturing these 
actors in the past to contain the Soviet Union. Not addressing this fundamental flaw in 
the trajectory of its foreign policy and remaining complacent in a state of inertia and 
stubbornness will further erode the possibility of progress in Afghanistan and 
facilitate the further ascendance of Jihadism.  
2. In its talks  with the Taliban, the West was only nominally negotiating with an 
organisation due to the fact that the Taliban’s leader had already been dead for over 
two years.  In engaging in talks with the Taliban the West has been surrendering its 
values to anti-democratic sponsors of this Jihadi outfit. If this strategy is not 
fundamentally reversed it will end up  recreating an Islamist Emirate in Afghanistan.  
A country, that once again could act as a global and regional launch pad for terrorism 
and a safe haven for fanaticism  
3. The West has to abandon its strategy made on chimeras, erroneous planted beliefs 
and wishful thinking and stick to facts, the most relevant of which was the raid in 
Abbottabad and the implications surrounding the capture of Osama bin Laden in 1st 
May 2011. The allies of the West are the women, students, intellectuals, 
professionals, minorities, common people who resist Jihadi indoctrination in 
Afghanistan; the enemies are the Taliban, its sponsors across the borders and the 
propagators of Jihadi ideology in the universities, madrassas, schools, associations or 
state apparatus organisations.  
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4. Consequently, the Taliban, including all its factions, such as the Haqqani network, 
and its splinter groups acting under the Islamic State or any other Jihadi banner 
should be designated as terrorist organisation(s) by all relevant actors within the 
international community.  
5. The international community must cooperate with the Afghan authorities in (1) 
Creating and implementing a system that can create an educational counter-narrative 
to jihadi propaganda, namely by hosting inter-faith dialogues and moderate Muslim 
learning with the aim of de-escalating hostility behaviour towards women, and 
minorities and raising awareness of Jihadi ideology; (2) Reducing internal and 
external fundamentalist influence by creating a “watch dog” institution that 
encourages, supports and gives Afghani teachers and educational professionals a 
voice, when they are pressured by groups to include jihadi teachings in the curricula; 
(3) Equipping and training the Afghani Air Force, provide armoured vehicles to ANA 
and ANP; (4) Revoking  precise troop withdrawal timelines that only support jihadist 
groups and implies defeat (5) Combatting narcotics and human trafficking;  
6. Afghani authorities and the international community should be encouraged to 
reinforce external cooperation namely in (1) Financing border initiatives between 
Afghanistan and CAR states as well reinforcing Afghanistan’s integration into 
SAARC; (2) Host track II diplomacy between Afghani and Pakistani stakeholders 
from civil society; (3) Support Indian authorities and civil society in its humanitarian 
and developmental approach in Afghanistan; (4) intensify cooperation in the realm of 
intelligence communication  
7. The West needs to create fiscal oversight to its unconditional aid to Pakistan, which 
is misappropriated by its security establishment to bolster favourable jihadi groups in 
Afghanistan. In addition it should find ways to redirect funds to civil society 
organisations in Pakistan that promote democratization, human rights, women 
empowerment, anti-corruption campaigns, religious freedom and minority rights 
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